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Losing Sticks from the Bundle: Incompatibility of
Tenancy by the Entireties and Drug Forfeiture
Laws
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, 1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced property
forfeiture laws in accordance with the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 2 The court's decision, while ostensibly protecting the innocent spouse's property
interest, failed to reconcile competing concerns of drug forfeiture legislation and the restrictions in tenancy by the entireties.
1500 Lincoln Avenue involved forfeited real property which
was held in tenancy by the entireties, a marital concurrent
ownership that is indivisible except by death or joint agreement
between spouses. Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, an owner of property subject to forfeiture may assert an innocent owner defense if the wrongdoer
utilized joint property without the innocent owner's knowledge
or consent. 3 In 1500 Lincoln Avenue, the Third Circuit, by
claiming a convicted drug dealer's interest, failed to protect his
innocent spouse's full interest their entireties estate.
Part II of this note examines tenancy by the entireties,
forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, and the Third Circuit's attempt to
reconcile the competing interests of both laws. Part III examines the Third Circuit's reasoning and compares its findings to
existing case law and applicable state law.

II. UNITED STATES V. 1500 LINCOLN AVENUE 4

A. Background
1.

History of tenancy by the entireties
Tenancy by the entireties originated in the feudal system's
1 949 F.2d n (3d Cir. 1991).
2 21 U.S.C. § HH1(a)(7) (1988).
a Id.
4 949 F.2d n Uld Cir. 1991).
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regime of land tenures and created concurrent marital property
ownership with an indestructible right of survivorship. 5
The concept became part of English common law and was
recognized as the only tenancy by which a husband and wife
could concurrently hold land. 6 The husband and wife were considered as one entity. 7 Thus, a single marital identity held the
property in its entirety, without divisible shares. 8 The tenancy
could be created only by a husband and wife with unity of an
ongoing marital relationship, time, title, interest and possession.9 It could be terminated only by death or divorce, with
sole ownership vesting in the surviving spouse. 10 Until the
late Nineteenth Century, a husband had exclusive control over
property held in tenancy by the entireties. He could convey or
encumber it without his wife's consent, subject only to such
wife's right of survivorship. 11
5 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5 (5th ed.
1984); Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 24 (1951). Feudal
land ownership and control was vested only in men, who were "presumably capable
of bearing arms in war" to fight their lords' battles in exchange for their land.
Women were considered as chattel and thus lacked legal capacity to assert ownership. Their identities upon marriage were merged and lost in their husbands'
dominant identities. !d. at 24. In ironic contrast, community property's separate
equal share principles have been traced to the Visigoths and other barbaric tribes
that recognized the wife as an equal partner who shared everyday life and labor
with her husband. 1 WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 11 (1943).
6 4A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 'JI 620 (1991). Sir
William Blackstone defined the tenancy by the entireties as it was described by Sir
Thomas Littleton's land law treatise in the mid-Fifteenth Century:
[I]f an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife being considered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but
both are seised of the entirety, per tout et non per my: the consequence of
which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part
without the assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 181 (Edward
Christian ed., Thomas B. Wait & Co. 1965) (1765).
7 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550-51 (3d ed.
1990). "[I]n the eyes of the law husband and wife were but one person: they were
two souls in one flesh." !d. "[T]he very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every
thing . . . . " 2 BLACK&'TONE, supra note 6, at 442; see also Phipps, supra note 5, at
24.
8 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5. Any conveyance to a husband
and wife was presumed to create a tenancy by the entireties, even if the conveyance stated a contrary intent. POWELL, supra note 6, '!I 620.
9 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, 'JI 620.
10 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, 'JI 620.
11 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, '!J 620.
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Tenancy by the entireties ownership was imported to the
North American English colonies as part of the English common law. Nineteenth Century social attitudes, however,
brought radical reformation to the legal status of women. 12
These changes and the subsequent passage of women's property acts prompted many jurisdictions to abolish tenancy by the
entireties or modify it to allow mutual control by both spouses.13 England abolished it entirely in 1925 by passing its Law
of Property Act which declared that husbands and wives were
to be treated as two distinct persons when acquiring property.14
While some United States jurisdictions have taken steps to
reform their tenancy by the entireties schemes, their treatment
of the subject remains a patchwork of inconsistency. Twentythree states, including Pennsylvania, 15 still allow creation of a
tenancy by the entireties. Remaining states have specifically
rejected the concept or simply do not recognize it as a valid
title for concurrent estates in land. 16
As our society grows more complex, tenancy by the entireties holdings create new dilemmas to be resolved by the courts.
Drug enforcement forfeiture laws present are an example of
such a dilemma.

According to Blackstone, restricting a woman's right to control property was for her
protection. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 442; Ruth B. Ginsburg, Gemlr-r and the
Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975). These notions were refuted by Nineteenth Century philosopher John Stuart Mill, who found such inequality of power
to be "one of the chief hindrances to human improvement." ld. at 2.
12 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note fi, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, 'lJ fi20.
13 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.fi; POWELL, supra note 6, 'lJ 622.
14 POWELL, supra note 6, 'll 620 n.7.
15 In re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802, 806 (Pa. 1927). See infra text accompanying notes 60 and 61.
16 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5 n.3; United States v. 15621 S.W.
209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1fill, 1519 n.9 (11th Cir. 1990). The following jurisdictions
still recognize tenancy by the entireties: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. ld.; see also Eric
G. Zajac, Tenancy by the Entireties and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime
Abuse and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, fi4 U. PITT. L. REV. 55::l, fi78 n.166
(1993). It is interesting to note the pattern of English common law influence. All
but three states are east of the Mississippi and 10 states were part of the original
Thirteen Colonies. Paradoxically, Alaska and Hawaii both achieved statehood only
within the last 40 years and established their statutory codes in a cultural and
social environment far removed from English common law.
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2. The forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act 17
The indivisible nature of property title held in tenancy by
the entireties has created difficulties in applying property forfeiture laws used to punish persons convicted of drug-related
crimes.
In 1984, Congress attempted to strengthen sanctions in
existing drug traffic legislation by adding property forfeiture
provisions. The new amendment allows the federal government
to claim the property interest of any person convicted of a drugrelated crime who used the property while committing the
underlying crime. 18 Legislative history of that legislation confirms clear congressional intent to attack illegal drug trade
through strong economic sanctions that would have an immediate and onerous effect on the convicted party. 19
At the same time, Congress also provided an innocent
owner defense to protect property owners who did not know
their property was being used in the commission of drug-related crimes. 20 In United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, 21 the
Third Circuit applied the innocent owner defense and attempted to reconcile the Act with tenancy by the entireties.
B. Facts of 1500 Lincoln Avenue

A. Leonard Bernstein, who owned and operated a pharmacy in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, pled guilty to nine drug-related
charges stemming from the illegal sale of pharmaceutical drugs
at his pharmacy. 22 Pursuant to § 881(a)(7), the federal government filed a forfeiture complaint for his interest in the real

17 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
18 Section 88l(a) states, in part: "The following shall be subject to forfeiture
to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: . . . . (7) All real
property, including any right, title, and interest . . . which is used, or intended to
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter . . . . "
19 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Scss. 191 (198:i), rPprintf'd in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. :ns2, 3374 ("Profit is the motivation for this criminal activity, and it
is through economic power that it is sustained and grows.").
20 ld. "[No I property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of
an interest of an owner, hy reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
21 949 F.2d
Uld Cir. 1991).
22 949 F.2d at 7fi.

n
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property at 1500 Lincoln Avenue containing the pharmacy. The
government noted that the property was jointly owned by Mr.
Bernstein and his wife, Linda Bernstein, in tenancy by the
entireties. 23 The government's action sought to convert the
interest to a tenancy in common.
To preserve her interest in the property, Mrs. Bernstein
claimed the innocent owner defense available under§ 881(a)(7).
Accordingly, she sought to have the complaint dismissed based
on the indivisible nature of her interest. 24 The district court
agreed, finding that under Pennsylvania common law, a tenant
by the entireties had undivided title to the property that could
not be severed by illegal activities on the land. 25
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed. The case was remanded to the district
court to determine if Mr. Bernstein's interest was subject to
forfeiture. 26 Subject to this determination, the Third Circuit
concluded that Mrs. Bernstein would be entitled to a life estate
in the property with the right to fee simple title only if her
husband predeceased her. 27

C. The Third Circuit's Reasoning
The Third Circuit reasoned that the life estate interpretation satisfied both the forfeiture purpose of§ 881 and its provision to protect the innocent owner's interest in the property. 28
In contrast, the trial court's decision to deny forfeiture frustrated enforcement of the statute's economic sanctions. 29
The Third Circuit looked to the legislative history of§ 881
and found a compelling public policy in enforcing economic
sanctions to fight a drug trade fueled by massive assets. 30
Such intent is reflected in the following language of the Senate:
"[T]he traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment
are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable

23 !d. at 74.
24 !d. at 75.
25 !d. The district court maintained that a spouse's innocent owner defense
bars civil forfeiture actions against property held in tenancy by the entirety.
26 !d. at 78.
27 !d.
28 !d. at 77-78.
29 !d. at 78.
30 !d. at 76-77; Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,
631 (1989); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
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trade in dangerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant
violence, is plaguing the country."31
In deciding as it did, the Third Circuit rejected altematives
offered by other courts. For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that no portion
of a tenancy by the entireties estate may be forfeited if there
was an innocent concurrent owner. 32 The Third Circuit considered the Eleventh Circuit's remedy of a lis pendens on the
guilty spouse's interest to be difficult to enforce at some future
time. 33 The Third Circuit reasoned: "[W]e do not see what purpose would be served by postponing adjudication of the
government's right to forfeiture ... rather than adjudicating
that issue when the evidence is still fresh." 34
Furthermore, the court reasoned that an exclusive life
estate, with the right to fee simple if she survived her husband,
gave the innocent spouse the same rights she enjoyed as a
tenant by the entireties. 35 Accordingly, the court adopted the
federal government's position that while Mr. Bemstein's property interest was subject to forfeiture, Mrs. Bernstein should
still be entitled to exclusive use of the property during her
lifetime, with right to fee simple absolute if she survived her
husband. 36

III.

ANALYSIS

While the Third Circuit's reasoning appears to be facially
equitable, there are flaws in its treatment of an innocent
spouse's property interest. First, the decision is at odds with
other judicial decisions involving similar facts. 37 Second, it is
31 S. REP No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374. See also Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 630, in which
the Court refused to exempt assets from forfeiture to be used to pay attorneys
fees, and noted that Congress has already underscored the compelling public interest in stripping criminals of their undeserved economic power, and part of that
undeserved power may be the ability to command high-priced legal talent.
32 15621 S. W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1514 (quoting Joint Explanatory
Statement of Titles I & II, 124 CONG. REc. S17647, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
9518, 9522).
33 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78.
34 ld. at 7R.
35 [d.
::!6 ld.
37 See, e.g., United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d ::!43, 352 (6th Cir.
1990); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1512 (11th Cir.
1990); United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander M. Toki and
Elizabeth M. Toki, 779 F. Supp. 1272, 1281-82 (D. Hawaii 1991); United States v.
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inconsistent with Pennsylvania common law decisions that
address the indivisible unity inherent in a tenancy by the entireties estate.

A. Decisions in Conflict with the Third Circuit
The district court in 1500 Lincoln Avenue dismissed the
forfeiture action, based on another appellate decision in United
States v. 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue. 38 In 15621 S. W. 209th
Avenue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit found it impossible to effectuate forfeiture of the guilty
spouse's interest in a tenancy by the entireties estate without
interfering with the innocent spouse's interest. 39 The facts of
the 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue case were substantially similar to
those present in 1500 Lincoln Avenue. The wife was an innocent owner by tenancy in the entireties of a family residence
used by her husband to conduct illicit drug sales. 40
The Eleventh Circuit, in analyzing § 881, found "the government obtains through forfeiture whatever interest remains
in the property after the innocent owner's interest has been
excepted."41 Since a tenant by the entireties owns an indivisible "right, title and interest" with his or her spouse, there is no
measurable interest left solely to a tenant that could be forfeited under § 881. 42 The court declared that the government
could prevent alienation of the guilty husband's interest in the
estate by filing a lis pendens against the property. 43 Should
both husband and wife terminate the estate by agreement or
divorce, or if the guilty husband survives his wife, the government is able to recover its interest in the guilty husband's
share. 44
The Third Circuit, however, rejected this solution as unwieldy and possibly unenforceable. It maintained that under a
lis pendens the government would have to "prove the underlying criminal conduct long after its occurred."45 This concern is
tenuous, since Mr. Bernstein was indicted, pled guilty, and is

1188.5 S.W. 46 St., 751 F. Supp. 1588 (S.D. Fla. 1990) .
.'38 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990).
39 Id. at 1512.
40 ld. at 1513.
41 Id. at 1516.
42 ld.
43 Id. at 1516 n.6.
44 ld.
45 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78.
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now serving a ten-year prison term. 46 Consequently, the required criminal conduct is a matter of record, and no further
proof is necessary to enforce the lis pendens.
While the Third Circuit showed concern for enforcement of
a forfeiture statute, its own life estate solution does not prevent
Mr. Bernstein from receiving benefits from the property. Mr.
Bernstein will still indirectly benefit, through his marital relationship, from profits flowing from his wife's life estate. Assuming the marriage continues after Mr. Bernstein is released from
prison, he will be able to share financial support that Mrs.
Bernstein is able to provide through her interest in the land.
The property may even provide living quarters for the
Bernsteins.
In addition, the 1500 Lincoln Avenue court and the government erroneously relied upon a Sixth Circuit decision. 47 That
decision actually supported the position taken by the Eleventh
Circuit in 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue. 48 In United States v.
2525 Leroy Lane, the property at issue had been sold, and the
court determined that the government was entitled to forfeit
the guilty spouse's interest in the proceeds. 49 Nevertheless,
the Sixth Circuit noted:
[T]he Government may properly acquire only the interest
which Mr. Marks [the guilty spouse] held as cotenant by the
entireties. However, the Government cannot occupy the position of Mr. Marks ... since the estate is founded on marital
union, and the Government obviously cannot assume the role
of spouse to Mrs. Marks. By acquiring Mr. Marks's interest in
the entireties estate, the Government is precluded from obtaining Mr. Marks's interest in the property unless and until
Mrs. Marks predeceases her husband or the entireties estate
is otherwise terminated by dissolution of the marriage or joint
conveyance. 5°

Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit found the Eleventh Circuit's lis
pendens solution to be appropriate protection of the
government's right to acquire an interest in real property held

46
47
(6th Cir.
48
49
50

!d. at 75.
!d. at 75; see also United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d :148, ::l51
1990).
2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 851-52.
!d. at 852.
Id.

197]

TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES

205

as an estate by the entireties. 51
Similarly, federal district courts have relied on the Sixth
Circuit and Eleventh Circuit decisions in preventing termination by forfeiture of tenancy by the entireties estates. 52 The
district court in 11885 S. W. 46 Street declared that in an entireties estate, no unilateral act of a spouse could alienate,
encumber, or forfeit the property. 53 Accordingly, it found the
government could not forfeit any interest in the family home
used by the husband in a cocaine transaction without his wife's
knowledge. 54 The unities of time, title, interest and possession
could not be destroyed by the husband's crime to create a tenancy in common. 55
In a comparable case, the district court in United States v.
Toki precluded government forfeiture of any property held as
tenancy by the entireties where there was an innocent co-owner.56 The Toki court closely followed both the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in 15621 S. W. 209 Avenue and the Sixth
Circuit's decision in 2525 Leroy Lane. 57 It concluded that the
federal government only acquires the right to file a lis pendens
against a property held in tenancy by the entireties, which
ripens upon lawful termination of the estate by the parties'
mutual agreement, divorce or death. 58

B. Applicability of Pennsylvania State Law
Not only did the Third Circuit reject other courts' decisions, it failed to interpret correctly Pennsylvania's common
law principles. It is well settled law that in determining property rights a federal court must look to appropriate state law,
even if federal statutes or the federal government are substantially involved in the cause of action. 59

51 ld.
52 See, e.g., United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander
M. Toki and Elizabeth M. Toki, 779 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Hawaii 1991); United States
v. 11885 S.W. 46 St., 751 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
53 11885 S.W. 46 St., 751 F. Supp. at 1539.
54 ld. at 1539-40.
55 ld.
56 779 F. Supp. at 1281-82. This decision did not determine whether or not
Mrs. Toki was an innocent owner with regard to her husband's convicted drug
activity. ld.
57 ld.
58 ld.
59 Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 378 (1977) ("[P]roperty ownership is not governed by a general federal law,

206

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

Pennsylvania common law continues to embrace the legal
fiction created by a tenancy by the entireties, notwithstanding
the realities of modern-day independent spousal rights. 60
"[T]he legal unity of husband and wife ... is a unity which
must continue to be recognized, however ... modern laws enlarge the separate rights and privileges of each."61 Husband
and wife are treated as one person, with each spouse able to
enjoy the property in its entirety and have the right of survivorship, but "neither one has any individual portion which can
be alienated or separated, or which can be reached by the creditors of either spouse."62
Under Pennsylvania common law, neither spouse may
compel partition or sever a tenancy by the entireties through a
unilateral conveyance or act by one party. The law also emphasizes that the sole right of a spouse's creditor is a "presently
unenforceable lien upon that spouse's expectancy of survivorship-a lien that becomes enforceable only when the other
spouse dies." 63
Pennsylvania courts, however, have recognized an implied
mutual agreement to terminate the tenancy under certain circumstances.64 According to the court in Clingerman v.
Sadowski, a spouse's misappropriation of an entireties estate
which excludes the other spouse from its use and enjoyment is
an offer to terminate the estate. 65 If the other spouse initiates
suit to reclaim his or her rightful interest, this response is con-

but rather by the laws of the several States."); 1.5621 S.W. 209 Ave., 894 F.2d at
1517-18.
60 United States v. 717 Woodward St., 804 F. Supp. 716, 723 (E.D. Pa.
1992); Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 380-81 (Pa. 1986) (paraphrasing
LADNER ON CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA, § 1.08 (4th ed. 1979).
61 In re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802, 806 (Pa. 1927). Pennsylvania's
devotion to women's equality in law is exemplified hy the following statute passed
in 1872 as part of the state's Married Women's Property Acts: "From and after
passage of this act, all contracts made by married women, in the purchase of sewing machines for their own use, shall be valid and binding, without the necessity
of the husband joining in the same." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 33 (1964) repealed
by Act of February 11, 1982, P.L. :n, No. 19, §1.
62 Madden v. Gossztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 200 A. 624, 627-28 (Pa.
1938); see also Beihl v. Martin, 84 A. 953, 957 (Pa. 1912) (property held as an
estate by the entireties was exempt from husband's bankruptcy).
63 Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Savings Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316, 319 (3d
Cir. 1982). Joint debts, however, may be reached by a creditor filing a lien on the
jointly owned property. ld.
64 Clingerman, 519 A.2d at 381.
65 ld.
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sidered acceptance of the offer to terminate. 66
In addition, property held by tenancy in the entireties is
exempt from execution and sale pursuant to bankruptcy by one
spouse. To allow enforcement of such an action would be "the
taking of the property of one to pay the debts of another." 67
While the "unity" concept of tenancy by the entireties often results in unfair treatment of creditors, 68 courts try to protect
against unfairness by scrutinizing such transfers for evidence
of fraudulent conveyance by debtors to exempt valuable property assets. 69
Accordingly, the district court's decision in 1500 Lincoln
Avenue that precluded destruction of the unity of a tenancy by
the entireties through forfeiture is consistent with state common law principles that forbid similar interference by a creditor or bankruptcy proceeding against one spouse. Moreover, Mr.
Bernstein's unlawful use of his pharmacy for unauthorized
pharmaceutical sales does not constitute a misappropriation or
an exclusion of his wife's interest consistent with the
Clingerman implied agreement rule. 70
In contrast, the Third Circuit's holding which allowed Mrs.
Bernstein a life estate in the subject property interfered with
her interest in a manner inconsistent with Pennsylvania common law. While the Third Circuit rejected the government's
argument that the tenancy be changed to a tenancy in common, 71 its decision had the actual effect of severing the entireties estate by reducing Mrs. Bernstein's property interest. She
retained her right to survivorship, but she had fewer rights to

66 Id.
67 Beihl, 84 A. at 953.
68 See generally James J. Vlasic, Tenancy by the Entireties: A Debtor's Haven, 65 MICH. B.J. 162-64 (1986).
69 See 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 349 ("Creation of an entireties estate
just prior to commission of a crime could, as in a bankruptcy context, be challenged in certain instances as a fraudulent conveyance.").
70 Clingerman and related cases involve highly mobile personal property held
as tenancy by the entireties, such as the bank accounts, art collections, and similar
assets. Clingerman, 519 A.2d at :~80. It is far more difficult to misappropriate real
property.
71 But compare an alternate solution proposed to amend § 881(a)(7) to
change a title held as tenancy in the entireties to tenancy in common if there is
an innocent owner-spouse. Eric G. Zajac, Tenancy by the Entireties and Federal
Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime Abuse and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, 54 U.
PJTI. L. REV. 553 (1993). While this alternative solves the problem presented by
the drug crime forfeiture laws, it does not solve similar conflicts with bankruptcy
and creditors' rights.
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the property than she did previously as a tenant by the entireties. The court's solution did not provide for any possible agreement between the government and Mrs. Bemstein to sell the
property and divide the proceeds. Rather if she attempted to
sell or lease her life estate interest, she would receive substantially less than she would in a lease or sale of a fee simple
interest. This conclusion is rooted in the fact that any buyer or
lessee would face the uncertain problem of possible reversion to
the government if Mrs. Bemstein predeceased her husband.
Thus, the Third Circuit solution compromises the property's
value and Mrs. Bemstein's fundamental right of alienability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tenancy by the entireties is based on a fictional unity that
is inconsistent with the complexities of modern law, particularly the property forfeiture laws discussed herein. As a result,
courts are unable to reach equitable results in cases involving
tenancy by the entireties. Consequently, this vestige from the
feudal system cannot always function effectively as a means of
modem concurrent ownership.
The Third Circuit misapplied common law tenancy by the
entireties rules in actually terminating an estate-an act that
can only be done by the husband and wife who created the
estate. While the court had a compelling interest in controlling
drug traffic through enforcement of§ 881, the fact remains that
its holding ignored applicable state law that governs real property ownership. Such a holding demonstrates how tenancy by
the entireties creates a dilemma. This dilemma is nonexistent
with other forms of concurrent ownership that are more consistent with current social and legal realities.
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